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DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY AS A RESPONSE TO
THE REIDENTIFICATION THREAT: THE
FACEBOOK ADVERTISER CASE STUDY*
ANDREW CHIN* & ANNE KLINEFELTER***
Recent computer science research on the reidentification of
individuals from anonymized data has given some observers in
the legal community the impression that the utilization of data is
incompatible with strong privacy guarantees, leaving few options
for balancing privacy and utility in various data-intensive
settings. This bleak assessment is incomplete and somewhat
misleading, however, because it fails to recognize the promise of
technologies that support anonymity under a standard that
computer scientists call differential privacy. This standard is met
by a database system that behaves similarly whether or not any
particular individual is represented in the database, effectively
producing anonymity. Although a number of computer scientists
agree that these technologies can offer privacy-protecting
advantages over traditional approaches such as redaction of
personally identifiable information from shared data, the legal
community's critique has focused on the burden that these
technologies place on the utility of the data. Empirical evidence,
however, suggests that at least one highly successful business,
Facebook, has implemented such privacy-preserving
technologies in support of anonymity promises while also
meeting commercial demands for utility of certain shared data.
This Article uses a reverse-engineering approach to infer that
Facebook appears to be using differential privacy-supporting
technologies in its interactive query system to report audience
reach data to prospective users of its targeted advertising system,
without apparent loss of utility. This case study provides an
opportunity to consider criteria for identifying contexts where
privacy laws might draw benefits from the adoption of a
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differential privacy standard similar to that apparently met by
Facebook's advertising audience reach database. United States
privacy law is a collection of many different sectoral statutes and
regulations, torts, and constitutional law, and some areas are
more amenable to incorporation of the differential privacy
standard than others. This Article highlights some opportunities
for recognition of the differential privacy standard as a best
practice or a presumption of compliance for privacy, while
acknowledging certain limitations on the transferability of the
Facebook example.
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INTRODUCTION
United States law relies heavily on anonymization techniques,
such as redaction of information like names and social security
numbers from shared data sets, in order to balance the privacy
interests of individuals and utility of data. Regulations under the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
1418 [Vol. 90
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("HIPAA"), for example, permit health care providers and their
business associates to satisfy requirements to deidentify individuals by
removing eighteen specific data elements.' Other privacy laws, like
the Video Privacy Protection Act of 19882 and the California Reader
Privacy Act,3 reveal reliance on this idea of protecting anonymity by
preventing the disclosure of personally identifying information,4 even
if the law avoids listing which data elements present the most risk to
individual's privacy. In addition, many businesses' privacy promises to
their customers, enforceable through consumer protection statutes,
tie privacy to anonymization.'
In a recent article, however, Paul Ohm writes that
anonymization6 techniques, such as the redaction of personally-
identifying information, have become ineffective as an approach to
reconciling the utilization of data with privacy concerns.7 This is bad
news for the privacy law community. Summarizing fifteen years of
1. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R § 164.514(b)(2)(i) (2010). The Privacy Rule Safe Harbor option
for deidentifying individuals in health data requires removal of eighteen types of
identifiers and no actual knowledge that the remaining data could be used to identify
individuals. An alternative provided in the rule is a statistical methodology shown by
experts to provide a low risk of identification of individuals. § 164.514(b)(2)(ii).
2. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (1988)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006)).
3. Reader Privacy Act of 2012, 2011 Cal. Legis. Serv. 424 (West) (codified at CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1798.90.05 (West 2012)).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3), (b)(2) (establishing liability for video tape service
providers who knowingly disclose information which identifies a person as having
requested or obtained specific video materials or services); CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 1798.90(b)(5), (c) (prohibiting book service providers from disclosing, except in certain
circumstances, any "information that relates to, or is capable of being associated with, a
particular user's access to or use of a book service or a book, in whole or in partial form").
North Carolina, like many other states, protects privacy of library use by prohibiting the
disclosure of "any library record that identifies a person," N.C. GEN. STAT. § 125-19(a)
(2011), yet allows the sharing of "nonidentifying material that may be retained for the
purpose of studying or evaluating the circulation of library materials in general." § 125-
18(2) (2011).
5. See, e.g., Data Storage and Anonymization, YAHOO!, http://info.yahoo.com
/privacy/us/yahoo/datastoragel (last visited May 4, 2012) (promising to "de-identify search
user log data within 18 months of collection, with limited exceptions," and defining
anonymization/deidentification as "a process of removing or replacing personal identifiers
in data records so that the resulting data is no longer personally identifiable").
6. Ohm defines anonymization as "a process by which information in a database is
manipulated to make it difficult to identify data subjects." Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of
Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1701,
1707 (2010). Ultimately, Ohm questions the usefulness of the term because of the threat of
reidentification. Id. at 1742. The term anonymity is used in this Article to describe the
broader condition of secrecy of the identity of an individual or data subject.
7. Id. at 1703-44 (discussing the history of reidentification techniques and how their
advancement has overcome the aims of most privacy regulation).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
computer science research, Ohm concludes that "researchers have
learned more than enough already for us to reject anonymization as a
privacy-providing panacea."8 In other words, even the most thorough
redaction of personally identifiable information has generally been
found insufficient to protect the privacy of individuals represented in
data sets.9 Ohm describes how standard relational database tools
facilitate the linking of anonymized data with outside information
through common data elements to reconstruct personally identifying
profiles.' Due to increased access to public, commercial, and other
information, reidentification is no longer difficult or expensive and is
capable of undermining traditional anonymization approaches in
startling ways. 1
Ohm employs the term "database of ruin" to describe the
collection of private facts about a person maintained in one computer
database or another that could cause that person legally cognizable
harm if more widely known. 2 Reidentification threatens everyone in
the modern world with the possible construction of his own personal
database of ruin.
As a hypothetical example of a problematic reidentification,
suppose that Jane Public from zip code 27514 notices her neighbor
John Doe's name and age (36) on the finisher's list for the 2011
Asheville AIDS Walk and 5K Run. She is curious about whether
John is HIV positive. Jane visits the targeted advertising area of
Facebook's Web site where she can obtain "audience reach" statistics
regarding the number of Facebook users whose profiles match a
specified combination of characteristics. 13 Jane finds that there is
8. Id. at 1716.
9. Id. at 1716-31. Much of the debate about anonymization concerns which data
elements are either immediately identifying and which are most likely to facilitate
reidentification. Compare, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PIH Problem:
Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814
passim (2011) (arguing for refinement, not rejection of anonymization approaches based
on removal of personally identifiable information), with Ohm, supra note 6, at 1742
(rejecting reliance on removal of personally identifiable information as an ever-expanding
"carnival whack-a-mole game"). The terminology of "personally identifiable information"
and "personal information" is sometimes used to describe both or either category
respectively. See Schwartz & Solove, supra, at 1826-28 (reviewing and explaining the
history of "personally identifiable information" as a model for privacy compliance in
United States law).
10. See Ohm, supra note 6, at 1717-31.
11. Id. at 1730-31.
12. See id. at 1748.
13. Facebook allows advertisers to estimate the size of the target populations for their
campaigns through a public interface that answers count queries regarding combinations
of various elements of user profiles, such as age, gender, geographic location, activities,
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exactly one male Facebook user aged 36 from zip code 27514 who
lists the "2011 Asheville AIDS Walk and 5K Run" as an interest.
Even though John has not made public his list of interests on his
Facebook profile, he is included in this count. 4 Jane then places an ad
targeted to Facebook users having this combination of characteristics
offering free information to HIV-positive patients about a new
antiretroviral treatment, If Jane is charged by Facebook for having
her ad clicked, she may infer with some confidence (though not
certainty) that John is HIV positive.
Such a scenario would be representative of what Ohm referred to
in his title as a "broken promise[] of privacy." Facebook's data use
policy assures users:
We do not share any of your information with advertisers
(unless, of course, you give us permission).
When an advertiser creates an ad on Facebook, they are given
the opportunity to choose their audience by location,
demographics, likes, keywords, and any other information we
receive or can tell about you and other users.... [W]e serve the
ad to people who meet the criteria the advertiser selected, but
we do not tell the advertiser who any of those people are. So,
for example, if a person clicks on the ad, the advertiser might
infer that the person is an 18-to-35-year-old woman who lives in
the US and likes basketball. But we would not tell the
advertiser who that person is. 5
As this hypothetical illustrates, Facebook's assurance that "we
do not tell the advertiser who any of those people [within the targeted
population] are"'16 does not necessarily preclude a party from
combining Facebook's statistical data with outside information to
infer their identities. The harm to John might be limited to the
disclosure of private health information to a nosy neighbor, but John
must hope Jane's intent is not malicious. One can easily imagine other
examples of reidentification that would expose information triggering
harassment, discrimination, or identify theft.
interests, education level, and workplace. Creating an Ad or Sponsored Story, FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/help/?page=175624025825871 (last visited May 4, 2012) (click
the arrow next to the question, "What are my targeting options for Facebook Ads or
Sponsored Stories?").
14. See infra text accompanying note 15.
15. Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/full-data-use-policy (last
updated Sept. 23, 2011).
16. Id.
20121 1421
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It bears noting, as Cynthia Dwork, a principal researcher at
Microsoft Corporation, 7 has pointed out, that Facebook does not
reveal to users the criteria specified for each ad that serves as the
basis for targeting them. 18 As our hypothetical illustrates, if those
criteria happen to be much more specific than a taste for basketball
and the advertiser happens to possess sufficient outside information
about the people who meet these criteria, Facebook's ad targeting
statistics could provide a basis for inferring the identity of a user who
clicks on the ad.'9 Facebook's database could even reveal sensitive
personally identifiable information to a party with outside
information who had no intention of advertising.20
Given these privacy concerns, it is fortunate that Facebook's ad
targeting database is programmed never to reveal that exactly one
Facebook user possesses a given combination of characteristics. In
fact, Facebook's database appears to restrict the disclosure of
statistical information even more carefully than is suggested by its
data use policy. Based on the empirical observations of Facebook's ad
targeting database described in Part III.A, Facebook has apparently
17. Cynthia Dwork has been described as "the world's foremost expert on placing
privacy-preserving data analysis on a mathematically rigorous foundation" with the
cornerstone of that work being differential privacy. ICDM 2011 Invited Speakers, INT'L
CONFERENCE ON DATA MINING 2011, http://icdm20ll.cs.ualberta.ca/invited-speakers
.php (last visited May 4, 2012). Dwork is a Distinguished Scientist at Microsoft, winner of
the Edsger W. Dijkstra Prize in Distributed Computing, a member of the U.S. National
Academy of Engineering, and a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Her work includes private data analysis, cryptography, combating of spam, complexity
theory, web search, voting theory, distributed computing, interconnection networks, and
algorithm design and analysis. See Cynthia Dwork, Curriculum Vitae 1, available at http://
research.microsoft.com/en-us/people/dwork/cv.pdf.
18. See Cynthia Dwork, I'm in the Database, but Nobody Knows, BERKMAN CENTER
FOR INTERNET & SOC'Y LUNCHEON SERIES 32:40 (Sept. 28, 2010), http://cyber.law
.harvard.edu/events/luncheon/2010/09/cdwork (discussing privacy attacks using ad-
targeting criteria to exploit outside knowledge and indentify individuals).
19. To give another artificial but illustrative example, Cynthia Dwork states that she
can be uniquely identified as (1) a Microsoft employee who is (2) a female (3)
distinguished scientist with (4) very curly hair. See Dwork, supra note 18, at 6:00
(discussing two "large set" queries that "differ only in me"). Any advertiser with outside
knowledge of this unique combination of characteristics of Dwork, if given the further
information that exactly one Facebook user possessed this combination of characteristics,
could target the combination and thereby identify Dwork as the person clicking on the ad.
20. As Dwork notes, anyone with outside knowledge that Dwork is the only person
with characteristics (1)-(4), see supra note 19, could infer from the number of people
having all of those characteristics and (5) "possesses the sickle cell trait" whether Dwork
possesses the sickle cell trait. See Dwork, supra note 18, at 6:50. Facebook's database
interface allows anyone to submit targeted advertising reach queries, and Facebook
encourages users with privacy concerns to "[tiry this tool yourself" even if they do not
intend to place an ad. See Data Use Policy, supra note 15.
[Vol. 901422
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implemented a privacy mechanism that can be shown to achieve a
relative notion of privacy, known as differential privacy, thereby
ensuring that Facebook's database does not contribute significantly to
the construction of any user's database of ruin. If this reverse-
engineering analysis of Facebook's privacy technology is correct, the
assurances in Facebook's data use policy need not represent "broken
promises of privacy," but provable guarantees of differential privacy
that also deliver sufficient utility of that shared data. As a
consequence, Facebook should be able to claim compliance with
consumer protection laws enforcing Facebook's policy promises
relating to this sharing of data with advertisers.21 In addition, this
example can serve as a proof of the concept that other laws balancing
privacy and utility of data could look to differential privacy as an
achievable standard to replace or supplement fragile anonymization
approaches.
The feasibility of achieving differential privacy while providing
useful statistical database information would appear to be of
particular interest to Facebook. Facebook's revenue model depends
heavily on the ability of advertisers to target users with specified
characteristics.22 At the same time, Facebook's privacy policies and
practices have faced continual scrutiny.' As one industry
commentator wrote in 2010, "The company's future depends on
finding just the right balance between the privacy expectations of its
users and the quality of the social marketing data it can serve to its
business partners. "24
If Facebook has, in fact, successfully implemented mechanisms in
its advertising reach database that achieve differential privacy for its
users, then this Facebook case study may be instructive in other
21. Facebook's promises not to identify individuals in its advertiser audience reach
system are enforceable by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), which has the
authority to investigate and issue a cease-and-desist order against a business for "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices." 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). Notably, Facebook's audience-reach
sharing is not the only type of sharing of member data that Facebook facilitates for its
advertisers, and some of those other types of sharing have recently been the subject of a
FTC investigation and settlement with Facebook. See Facebook, Inc.; Analysis of
Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, 76 Fed. Reg. 75,883, 75,884 (Dec. 5,
2011) ("Facebook promised users that it would not share their personal information with
advertisers; in fact, Facebook did share this information with advertisers when a user
clicked on a Facebook ad.").
22. See Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-i) 40, 55 (Feb. 1, 2012),
available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000119312512034517/d287954dsl
.htm (stating 2011 revenues of $3.711 billion, 83% of which came from advertising).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 125-26.
24. Mark Sullivan, How Will Facebook Make Money?, PCWORLD (June 15, 2010,
1:00 AM), http://web.archive.org/web/20100616061911/pcworld.com/article/198815.
2012] 1423
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privacy contexts where the reidentification threat may arise. Widely
publicized events have demonstrated the risk of reidentification when
statistical data has been released under the assumption that the
redaction of personally identifiable information adequately protects
individual privacy. Netflix attempted to deidentify individuals when it
released subscriber data in a contest for developers to create new
programs to help Netflix improve its movie recommendation
service. 5 Although Netflix removed key elements considered
personally identifying information, the surviving shared information
was compared with publicly accessible data to reveal several
individuals' identities, along with their movie rental habits.26 This
exposure led to a lawsuit against Netflix for violation of the federal
Video Privacy Protection Act and several California laws 27 and
caused the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") to raise objections to
a second such contest.28 In reaching a settlement in the lawsuit and in
resolving the FTC inquiries, Netflix announced it had agreed to
25. See Steve Lohr, Nerflix Cancels Contest After Concerns Are Raised About Privacy,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2010, at B3 (reporting that "supposedly anonymized data" from
Netflix customer records was used by researchers to reidentify individuals).
26. Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-anonymization of Large
Sparse Datasets, 29 INST. ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS SYMP. ON SECURITY
& PRIVACY 111, 111-25 (2008), available at http://www.cs.utexas.edu/-shmat/shmat
_oak08netflix.pdf (describing how researchers were able to identify some individuals in
the released Netflix data by comparing names and dates attached to movie reviews posted
to the publicly accessible Internet Movie Database, imdb.com).
27. The complaint pointed out that the shared information violated not only privacy
promises made by Netflix to its customers, but also violated the federal Video Privacy
Protection Act of 1988 and several California consumer laws, constituted unjust
enrichment, and implicated the common law privacy tort of public disclosure of private
facts. See Jury Demand, Class Action Complaint at 1, Valdez-Marquez v. Netflix, Inc., No.
5:09-cv-05903 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2009), available at http://www.wired.com/images blogs
/threatlevel/2009/12/doe-v-netflix.pdf (alleging violation of: "(1) Video Privacy Protection
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710, 2) Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710, 3) California
Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Civil Code § 1750, 4) California Customer Records Act,
Civil Code § 1798.80, 5) California Unfair Competition Law, Business and Professions
Code § 17200, 6) California False Advertising Law, Business and Professions Code
§ 17500, 7) Unjust Enrichment, 8) Public Disclosure of Private Facts"). The Video Privacy
Protection Act of 1988 created liability for videotape service providers that knowingly
disclose "personally identifiable information concerning any consumer" with certain
exceptions that did not cover the Netflix context. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b) (2006).
28. The FTC contacted Netflix and warned that the "risk of re-identification and the
extent to which Netflix's previous representations to its customers about disclosure of
their information would raise concerns under Section 5 of the FTC Act." See Letter from
Maneesha Mithal, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Privacy & Identity Prot., Fed. Trade Comm'n, to
Reed Freeman, Morrison & Foerster LLP, Counsel for Netflix, Inc. 2 (Mar. 12, 2010),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/100312netflixletter.pdf. Section 5 of the FTC
Act grants the FTC authority to investigate and bring enforcement actions for unfair and
deceptive trade practices. FTC Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
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"certain parameters" for how the company would use Netflix data
and would cancel the second contest.29
Another high-profile reidentification occurred when Latanya
Sweeney, then a graduate student at MIT, merged presumably
anonymized Massachusetts state worker hospital records with voter
registration records and was able to identify rather quickly the health
records of then-Governor William Weld.3" Sweeney later published a
broader study finding that 87% of the 1990 U.S. Census population
could be indentified using only gender, zip code, and full date of
birth,3" and others reproduced this work in the 2000 Census with 63%
success in identifying individuals. 32
The vulnerability of anonymization could undermine established
compromises between privacy and competing interests reflected in
several areas of the law.33 Although computer scientists warn that
removal of personally identifiable information is now a privacy
fallacy, key areas of the law, notably health privacy, incorporate
suppression of identifying data elements as privacy compliance.' In
addition, many websites and companies promise to protect the
privacy of customer data by anonymizing it before it is shared.35
29. Neil Hunt, Netflix Prize Update, NETFLIX U.S. & CANADA BLOG (Mar. 12, 2010),
http:/Iblog.netflix.comi2010/03/this-is-neil-hunt-chief-product-officer.html (reporting
settlement of the lawsuit and FTC investigation, but not revealing the amount of any
financial payment or acknowledging violation of any law).
30. Recommendations To Identify and Combat Privacy Problems in the
Commonwealth: Hearing on H.R. 351 Before the H. Select Comm. on Info. Sec., 2005 Gen.
Assemb., 189th Sess. (Pa. 2005) (statement of Latanya Sweeney, Associate Professor,
Carnegie Mellon University), available at http://dataprivacylab.org/dataprivacy/talks/Flick
-05-10.html.
31. See Latanya Sweeney, Simple Demographics Often Identify People Uniquely 2, 3
(Carnegie Mellon Univ., Working Paper No. 3, 2000), available at http://dataprivacylab.org
/projects/identifiability/paperl.pdf (finding that 216 million of 248 million persons
represented in the 1990 Census were identifiable with only these three characteristics).
32. Philippe Golle, Revisiting the Uniqueness of Simple Demographics in the US
Population, 5 ASS'N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY WORKSHOP ON PRIVACY
ELECTRONIC SOC'Y 77, 78 (2006) (testing the findings of Latanya Sweeney for the 1990
Census and extending those tests generally to the 2000 Census with identification rates of
61% and 63% respectively).
33. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 9, at 1826-28.
34. See HITECH Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 11-5, § 13424, 123 Stat. 226, 276-79
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A § 17953 (Supp IV 2010) (recognizing privacy compliance when
eighteen data points, considered personally identifying, are removed from health data that
is to be shared as required by 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i) (2010)). Similarly, the Video
Privacy Protection Act of 1988 requires suppression of personally identifiable information
except under limited circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b) (2006).
35. For example, Amazon.com's privacy policy says the company avoids "selling,
renting, sharing, or otherwise disclosing personally identifiable information from
customers for commercial purposes." See Amazon.com Privacy Notice, AMAZON.COM,
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A number of legal observers have agreed with Ohm that
reidentification threatens the viability of common practices that
attempt to reconcile data utility with individual privacy.36 The FTC
has reported that the threat of reidentification is at the heart of its
demand for new types of "privacy by design."37 Debate continues,
though, over how to address this threat, both as a functional matter
and as a matter of law. Ohm recommends several approaches
including releasing deidentified data only to trusted researchers, with
contractual or regulatory restrictions on uses beyond those deemed
beneficial and presumably privacy respecting.38 Paul Schwartz and
Daniel Solove concede the difficulty of perfecting and enforcing these
approaches, but protest big shifts that would restructure both the law
and the habits of those handling sensitive data.39 Schwartz and Solove
recommend retention but refinement of the concept of "personally
identifying information," with some categorical standards and
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=footer-privacy/177-4355798-
3623704?ie=UTF8&nodeld=468496 (last updated Apr. 6, 2012); see also Data Storage and
Anonymization, supra note 5 ("Yahoo! takes additional steps so that data collected and
used to customize interest based advising ... are not associated with personally
identifiable information.").
36. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and
Regulation in a Digital Age, 88 TEx. L. REV. 669, 716 (2010) (criticizing institutions' inertia
in addressing new privacy threats to established systems of anonymization); Robert
Gellman, The Deidentification Dilemma: A Legislative and Contractual Proposal, 21
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 33, 35 (2010) ("[T]he value of data for
legitimate uses, such as research, may be significantly reduced when the data is processed
without identifiers which were removed to protect privacy."). But see Jane Yakowitz,
Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8-10, 36-42, 48-50 (2011)
(arguing that reidentification rarely occurs, that the social value of access to accurate data
outweighs the threat of reidentification, and that criminalization of reidentification is the
proper solution).
37. Edith Ramirez, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Keynote Address at the 28th
Annual Institute on Telecommunications Policy & Regulation 2-3 (Dec. 9, 2010),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ramirez/101209fcbaspeech.pdf (explaining that
reidentification threats are the main reason for the FITC's call for stronger privacy
protections, including "privacy by design," though not specifically mentioning differential
privacy); see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA
OF RAPID CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS
43 (Dec. 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf (noting
that the FTC's proposals are "supported by a wide cross section of roundtable participants
who stated that the traditional distinction between PII and non-PII continues to lose
significance due to changes in technology and the ability to re-identify consumers from
supposedly anonymous data"). "Privacy by design" is a concept promoted by Ann
Cavoukian, Information and Privacy Commissioner, Ontario, Canada that calls for
structural support for privacy protection. See Privacy by Design, PBD,
http://privacybydesign.ca (last visited May 4, 2012).
38. See Ohm, supra note 6, at 1764-69.
39. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 9, at 1883-86.
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practices to match levels of risk for reidentification. 40 Robert Gellman
proposes a federal statute that data disclosers and data recipients
could invoke through contract to gain safe harbor protection by
conformity with the statute's requirements for anonymization and
prevention of reidentification."
Few legal scholars or lawmakers have proposed differential
privacy as a response to the threat of reidentification even in limited
circumstances, 42 but the Facebook advertiser interactive reporting
system suggests that differential privacy may have substantial promise
for addressing a number of privacy threats from reidentification. A
guarantee of differential privacy assures that presence or absence of
any one individual in the database makes no significant difference in
the likelihood of each possible response to a database query.43
Differential privacy guarantees, therefore, provide meaningful
protection from even the possibility of linkage to auxiliary data sets,
40. See id. at 1886-93.
41. See Gellman, supra note 36, at 47-61 (outlining a statutory proposal to prevent
reidentification while allowing researchers useful access to data with "overt identifiers"
that alone or in combination with other information could be used to identify a particular
individual).
42. Paul Ohm has several criticisms of differential privacy mechanisms: they are less
flexible than traditional anonymization, too expensive because of the need to have
constant participation of a data administrator, and burdensome on utility of the data
because of the introduction of randomization producing noise or inaccuracies in the
responses to queries. Ohm, supra note 6, at 1756-57. Ohm also challenges the
effectiveness of the privacy protection in certain circumstances, id., and the applicability of
these techniques in all situations. Id. at 1751. Thus, he argues instead for expanded
prohibitions against and remedies for reidentification and facilitators of reidentification.
Id. at 1759-61. In an overview of the problems of reidentification and potential solutions,
Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov endorse differential privacy as a "major step in
the right direction," but concede that it is not adaptable to all situations and must be "built
and reasoned about on a case-by-case basis." Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov,
Privacy and Security Myths and Fallacies of "Personally Identifiable Information," COMM.
ASS'N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY, June 2010, at 24, 26, available at http://www.cs
.utexas.edu/-shmat/shmat-cacml0.pdf. Jane Yakowitz critiques "noise-adding"
techniques as overburdening utility. Yakowitz, supra note 36, at 46-47 (2011). Yakowitz,
nonetheless, concludes her argument that reidentification risk has been overstated by
alluding to the promise of systems that are probably differential privacy technologies, but
she suggests implementation may take time. Id. at 66-67 (citing American FactFinder, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml)
(describing "[s]tatistical software that allows the dataset to remain on a secure server
while researchers submit statistical queries").
43. Cynthia Dwork, A Firm Foundation for Private Data Analysis, COMM. ASS'N FOR
COMPUTING MACHINERY, Jan. 2011, at 86, 91 (defining differential privacy). Dwork is a
major proponent and developer of differential privacy and tools in support of differential
privacy. Dwork, with others, holds several patents for differential privacy related
programs. See Cynthia Dwork: Patents, MICROSOFT RESEARCH, http://research.microsoft
.com/en-us/people/dwork/patents.aspx (last visited May 4, 2012).
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including ones that could be developed at some future time." As
Ohm acknowledges, a mechanism that achieves differential privacy
"ensur[es] mathematically that even the most sophisticated
reidentifier will not be able to use the answer to unearth information
about the people in the database. ' 45 Prospects for practical
implementation of differentially private database systems are
continually improving, as an active community of computer science
researchers has been refining mechanism designs' and releasing
software development tools 47 in recent months.
With these prospects in mind, we believe our Facebook case
study, to the extent that it may reveal the most commercially
successful practical implementation of a differentially private
database system, may helpfully inform data managers and
policymakers in responding to the reidentification threat. The
remainder of this Article is organized as follows. In Part I, we
formalize the notion of differential privacy and descriptions of
database mechanisms that achieve differential privacy. Part II
presents our reverse-engineering analysis of Facebook's advertising
reach database, concluding that the database's observed behavior is
consistent with the hypothesis that Facebook has implemented
differentially private mechanisms to protect individual user data. Part
II also assesses the effectiveness and practicality of these mechanisms.
Part III situates the Facebook case study among other contexts where
there is a tension between privacy and utility and derives from the
case study several criteria relevant to identifying those contexts where
44. Differential privacy avoids the problem of predicting which data elements are
likely to be used with external data sets, especially future data sets, to achieve linkage
attacks that would reidentify an individual. The debate over which data is "personally
identifiable" is largely avoided.
45. See Ohm, supra note 6, at 1756.
46. See, e.g., Xiaokui Xiao, Guozhand Wang & Johannes Gehrke, Differential Privacy
Via Wavelet Transforms, 23 INST. ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS
TRANSACTIONS ON KNOWLEDGE & DATA ENGINEERING 1200, 1200-01 (2011)
(describing a mechanism that achieves differential privacy while releasing accurate results
for range-count queries).
47. See Frank McSherry, Privacy Integrated Queries: An Extensible Platform for
Privacy-Preserving Data Analysis, COMM. ASS'N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY, Sept.
2010, at 89, 89 (describing a new data-handling software development platform he has
dubbed PINQ, for Privacy Integrated Queries, that he says makes deploying differential
privacy easier for end users); Frank McSherry & Ratul Mahajan, Differentially-Private
Network Trace Analysis, 2010 ASS'N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY SPECIAL INT. GROUP
ON DATA COMM. 123, 123 (testing systems using differential privacy and concluding that
the error rates caused by the technique were low and that the technique held great
promise).
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the notion of differential privacy can usefully play a role in standards
of privacy compliance.
I. ACHIEVING DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY IN PRINCIPLE
At its core, the reidentification threat arises from the possibility
that an attacker may have access to outside information that, when
combined with information released by a database, allows the
attacker to infer private information about an individual. Given the
likelihood that a sophisticated attacker will have access to advanced
computational tools and a vast supply of personal data, it seems
prudent for both data managers and policymakers to operate from
pessimistic assumptions about the performance of privacy
technologies.
Such pessimism, however, forms only part of the landscape in the
computer science research community. Confronted with the
impossibility of providing absolute privacy against a powerful, well-
informed adversary, researchers have turned their attention to
developing database technologies that can at least guarantee a relative
form of privacy. The idea is that no one can hide information that has
already been made accessible to an attacker, but data managers can
exercise care so that the release of information about a group does
not further compromise any individual's private information.
Computer scientists, led by Dwork, have formalized this notion
of relative privacy as a mathematical criterion known as differential
privacy, which is defined as follows:
A randomized function K gives 8-differential privacy if, for all
data sets D1 and D2 differing on at most one element, and all
S g Range(K),
Pr[K(D,) E S] < exp(e) x Pr[K(D2) E S] 48
In reading this definition, it is helpful to think of a database
server containing private information about each individual in a
database D. To protect this private information, the server is
programmed not to respond to queries with the actual answer, but
with a randomized response K(D) (a function defined over the set of
all possible databases) that is generally close enough to the truth to be
useful. If K also satisfies the condition that it gives 8-differential
privacy, then the server's response to any given database query (e.g.,
48. See Cynthia Dwork, Differential Privacy: A Survey of Results, in THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS OF MODELS OF COMPUTATION 1, 3 (Manindra Agrawal et al. eds., 2008).
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the query "Is K(D)cS") is unlikely to be changed by the inclusion of
any given individual in the database. The parameter c > 0 serves to
calibrate the stringency of the condition: if e is very close to 0, then
exp(e) is very close to 1, giving a tight bound on multiplicative
changes in the probability distribution of K resulting from any single-
element change in D. As Dwork explains:
Any mechanism [K] satisfying this definition addresses all
concerns that any participant might have about the leakage of
her personal information .... Even if the participant removed
her data from the dataset, no outputs (and thus consequences
of outputs) would become significantly more or less likely. For
example, if the database were to be consulted by an insurance
provider before deciding whether or not to insure a given
individual, then the presence or absence of any individual's data
in the database will not significantly affect her chance of
receiving coverage. 9
More tersely, differential privacy allows each user to be assured that
"I'm in the database, but nobody knows," to borrow the title of a talk
given by Dwork at Harvard Law Schooli 0
Crucially, Dwork and her colleagues at Microsoft51 have also
demonstrated that it is possible to design a mechanism that not only
guarantees 8-differential privacy for some E > 0, but also provides
49. Dwork, supra note 43, at 91.
50. Dwork, supra note 18.
51. Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 7,562,071, assigned to Microsoft Corporation, appears
to cover the use of Laplace noise addition to the output of a statistical database for the
purpose of supporting a privacy guarantee. Claim 1 reads:
1. A method for producing a noisy output that reduces predictability of data
inputs while increasing accuracy of said noisy output, the method comprising:
formulating a query against data associated with a plurality of privacy
principals and stored in a database;
evaluating the query to determine a query diameter measurement;
performing the query on one or more data inputs;
calculating by a computer processor an output of the query;
calculating by a computer processor a substantially exponential distribution of
noise values as a function of the query diameter measurement and a privacy
parameter, the substantially exponential distribution being calculated according to
a Laplacian distribution;
combining by a computer processor said output with a noise value selected
from the calculated substantially exponential distribution of noise values to
produce the noisy output; and
disclosing the noisy output.
U.S. Patent No. 7,562,071 (filed Dec. 2, 2005).
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usable information about the database's contents. One such
mechanism K disguises the true value of a database query f (D) by
the addition of random noise taken from the Laplace distribution
Lap(b) defined by the probability density function
p (x ; b ) = Il e xlb, --o00 < X < 00 52
2b
with mass at x, where the scale parameter b is defined by
b = Af/ = maxlIf(D)-f(D2)I/ e,
and where D1D2 range over all possible databases differing on at most
one element.53 For any r e Range(K), the ratio
Pr[K(D,) = r] -exp(- f(DI) - rI/(Af / e))
Pr[K(D 2) = r] exp -If(D2)-r/(Af /c))
>exp If (DI)-f(DOI)
> exp(-s),
from which it follows that K provides e -differential privacy.54 This
so-called "Laplace noise addition" mechanism K produces a
reasonable proxy for the true value of a database query when it adds
relatively little noise from Lap(b). The variance of Lap(b) is 2b2,
which increases as b = Af/ c increases, so b needs to be kept relatively
small. Thus, Laplace noise addition is especially suitable for count
databases; i.e., those in which the queries f (D) are all assumed to be
"count" queries of the form "How many rows have property P?,"
since for these queries Af = 1 and b = 1 / 01
Mechanisms that provide c-differential privacy are so secure that
there is no need for the database manager to obscure the
mechanism's design. Thus, the fact that K's output incorporates
random noise from Lap (Af/c) can be made public without
52. See Dwork, supra note 48, at 4. See generally SAMUEL KOTZ ET AL., THE
LAPLACE DISTRIBUTION AND GENERALIZATIONS (2001) (discussing the Laplace
distribution in more depth).
53. See Dwork, supra note 48, at 4; see also Cynthia Dwork et al., Calibrating Noise to
Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis, in THEORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY 265,270 (Shai Halevi
& Tal Rabin eds., 2006) (presenting the original result).
54. See Dwork, supra note 48, at 4.
55. See id.
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compromising the privacy of the database in any way.56 As it would
be immediately apparent that any fractional portion of a query result
represented random noise, however, the manager of a count database
may choose to restrict the range of query results to the set of whole
numbers. For this purpose, K may be slightly modified by using a
discrete version of the Laplace distribution, DL(p), in place of the
continuous distribution Lap(b), where for pe(0,1), DL(p) has the
probability distribution function
57
Pr(Y = k) P pkkEZl+p
It is straightforward to verify that for p = 1/b = exp(-c/Af), a
mechanism that adds noise from DL(p) provides c-differential
privacy. Again, for count databases, Af = 1, and thus p = exp(--). The
next Part will test the hypothesis, inter alia, that Facebook is using
such a mechanism in connection with its ad targeting database.
II. ACHIEVING DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY IN PRACTICE:
FACEBOOK'S ADVERTISING REACH DATABASE
A. Reverse-Engineering Facebook's Privacy Technology
Facebook's ad targeting database is readily available for
experimentation. 8 After designing an ad, a would-be advertiser (or
someone posing as an advertiser) completes a form specifying the
characteristics of Facebook's users to be targeted by the ad.59 As the
advertiser enters criteria into the form, Facebook's web interface
automatically updates an "Estimated Reach" statistic corresponding
to the number of users matching all of the selected criteria, as
illustrated by the examples in Figure 1.'
56. See id. at 3 (noting the assumption that the parameter c is public).
57. See Seidu Inusah & Tomasz J. Kozubowski, A Discrete Analogue of the Laplace
Distribution, 136 J. STAT. PLAN. & INFERENCE 1090,1092 (2006).
58. Creating an Ad or Sponsored Story, supra note 13.
59. See Advertise on Facebook, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/ads/create/
(last visited May 4, 2012).
60. See id.
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Figure 1: Examples of Facebook's Reports of Advertising Reach Data
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A casual observation of these "Estimated Reach" statistics
reveals that the target audience is always reported as a multiple of
twenty people, with estimates of less than forty reported as "fewer
than 20 people."61 The obvious conclusion is that Facebook has
implemented a rounding mechanism that obscures the true value of
the reach statistic in question.
Less obviously, Facebook's respective estimates for a targeted
group and for the same group broken into disjoint subgroups often
reveal small but substantial deviations from additivity.6 2 For example,
as of October 2011, among North Carolina Facebook users interested
in Alzheimer's disease, Facebook reports 340 users aged fifty, 320
users aged fifty-one, and 620 users aged between fifty and fifty-one
inclusive. 63 The discrepancy (340 + 320) - 620 = 40 is too large to be
attributed to rounding error.' Moreover, these deviations appear to
be persistent over the short term; repeating the same queries one
hour later produces the same results.
These observations give rise to a two-part conjecture: first, that
in addition to rounding, Facebook has implemented a mechanism that
further obscures the true values of its reach statistics; and second, that
if this mechanism is not deterministic, Facebook maintains a cache to
ensure consistent responses to the same query over the short term.
To test this conjecture, we used a Perl script (developed by our
research assistant Andrew Gregory) to submit queries automatically
61. See id.
62. Additivity is the mathematical characteristic describing any function f such that
f(x + y) =flx) +f(y). ZALMAN USISKIN ET AL., MATHEMATICS FOR HIGH SCHOOL
TEACHERS: AN ADVANCED PERSPECTIVE 14 (2002).
63. See Advertise on Facebook, supra note 59 (data obtained Oct. 24,2011).
64. Assuming that Facebook's mechanism rounds values to the nearest multiple of
twenty, the lowest possible true sizes of the fifty- and fifty-one-year-old groups are 330 and
310, respectively, which would give a population of at least 640, not 620, for the fifty- and
fifty-one-year-old group. This observation also holds under the alternative assumptions
that values are rounded down or up to the nearest multiple of twenty.
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to Facebook's advertising reach database. Our queries focused on
variations in two types of user characteristics-specified topics of
interest and specified age ranges-across the U.S. population of
Facebook users.
Given the heightened privacy concerns that may pertain to
interests in medical topics,65 we compiled our provisional list of topics
from three sources: a list of diseases taken from the topics list on the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention website,66 a list of
psychiatric disorders from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders,67 and a list of branded and generic medications
compiled by Medicinenet.com.68 Since many of the items in these lists
did not match a unique topic of interest in Facebook's advertising
reach database, we used the interface's auto-suggest feature to
identify, for each term in the provisional list, the related topic of
interest associated with the highest number of Facebook users. Thus,
for example, "Fibromyalgia" was converted to "Fibromyalgia
Awareness," and "Lupus" was converted to "Lupus Foundation of
America." These converted terms comprised a final list of 363 topics
of interest.
Facebook's interface allows targeting of ages using intervals
whose endpoints are between fourteen and sixty-four years of age.69
We broke the fifty-year interval between fourteen and sixty-three
years inclusive into one-, two-, five-, and ten-year subintervals (a total
of ninety subintervals) to be specified in connection with each topic of
interest. In all, therefore, we formulated 363 x 90 = 32,670 distinct
queries.
To test the consistency of Facebook's responses, we repeated
each query five times, several hours apart. In 633 of the 32,670 cases,
the responses we received to the same query did not all agree. In
these cases, we reran the query an additional twenty times. In each of
these cases, the resulting distribution of responses allowed us to
65. See generally Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"), 42
U.S.C. § 1320d(6)(B) (2006) (describing individually identifiable information as
information collected from an individual relating to an individual's "past, present, or
future physical or mental health or condition..., provision of health care... , or the past,
present, or future payment for the provision of health care[,]" which either identifies or
reasonably could identify the individual).
66. CDC A-Z Index, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc
.gov/az (last updated Mar. 14, 2011).
67. Index of Psychiatric Disorders, ALLPSYCH ONLINE, http://allpsych.com
/disorders/disordersdsmlVcodes.html (last visited May 4, 2012).
68. Medications A-Z List - A, MEDICINENET.COM, http://www.medicinenet.com
/medications/alpha-a.htm (last visited May 4, 2012).
69. See Advertise on Facebook, supra note 59.
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identify a consensus response for further statistical analysis, in that at
least 21 of the 25 responses agreed. These results are summarized in
Table 1. As we will see, this high level of agreement provides strong
statistical evidence of short-term caching.
Table 1: Levels of AgreementAmong the Facebook Database's
Responses to Repeated Queries
23 of 25 65
21 of 25 1
Our statistical analysis of the consensus responses focuses on the
discrepancies between the query results for two-year intervals and the
sums of the corresponding pairs of query results for one-year intervals
covering the same age ranges, and the analogous discrepancies for
ten-year versus paired five-year intervals (hereinafter referred to
simply as "discrepancies"). 7  Our conjecture, stated more formally
and specifically as a null hypothesis, is that the observed distribution
of the discrepancies reflects Facebook's use of both rounding
(modulo 20) and discrete Laplace noise-addition mechanisms. 7' To
test this hypothesis, we calculated the expected distribution of the
discrepancies as a derived distribution based on the distributions of
five discrete random variables: a, b, z1, z2, and z3, where the zl's are
taken at random from DL(p) (where p = exp(-8)); and a and b, the
remainders (modulo 20) of the true values, x and y, of the reach
statistics in question (i.e., x = 20m + a and y = 20n + b for some
integers m, n, a, b with a, b E [0,19]) are each taken at random from
DU(20), the discrete uniform distribution taking on values 0, 1,...,
19. The discrepancy f associated with the hypothesized mechanism's
reporting of the reach statistics x, y, and x+y can then be expressed as
the function
70. For an example of this calculation, see supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
71. After rounding, the effects of Laplace noise addition and discrete Laplace noise
addition are indistinguishable, so an equivalent conjecture is that Facebook is simply using
Laplace noise addition. The discrete formulation is preferable here because it allows the
use of generating functions to simplify the calculation of the derived distribution f.
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AX Y'ZIZ2'5Z3) = 20a+b+z3+k a+z +k b+Z2+k
(1 20 J L 20 iL1 20 ])
where k E {1, 10, 11, 20} is a parameter specifying the rounding
discipline (i.e., the threshold remainder (modulo 20) at which the
rounding mechanism switches from rounding down to rounding up to
the next multiple of 20).
The generating functions A(x), B(x), and Z(x) respectively
associated with the distributions for a, b, and each zI are given by
1
A(x) = B(x) = - I- X
and 20 nr[0,19]
Z(x)= -P In
I + P neZ
From these functions, we can numerically calculate the generating
function F(x) associated with f with arbitrarily high precision for any
choice of parameters E and k. For 8 = 0.181 and k = 11, we have
F(x) 0.000314x - 80 + 0.00552x - 60 + 0.0587x - 40 + 0.235x - 20 + 0.379
+ 0.254x 20 + 0.0606x 40 + 0.00587x 60 + 0.00552x 8° .
In the above analysis, our modeling of a and b as random
variables uniformly distributed on [0,19] was based on the simplifying
assumption that the empirical probability distributions of x and y are
locally approximately uniform over every twenty-person interval.
Since it is reasonably likely that these empirical probability
distributions resemble a power law distribution,72 we confined our
calculation of discrepancies to those cases where each of the reported
reach statistics was at least 1,000 (i.e., situated in the distribution's flat
tail). Our dataset of consensus responses by Facebook's database to
our 32,670 queries yielded 850 observed discrepancies of this kind.
Table 2 compares the distribution of the 850 observed discrepancies
with the hypothesized distribution f for the choice of parameters
8 = 0.181 and k = 11.
72. Cf Norman S. Matloff, Another Look at the Use of Noise Addition for Database
Security, 1986 INST. ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS SYMP. ON SECURITY &
PRIVACY 173, 178 (showing that adding noise from a symmetric distribution to a
numerically positive variable with a strictly decreasing density function tends to introduce
negative bias). See generally CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF
BUSINESS IS SELLING LESS OF MORE (2006) (explaining the observed ubiquity of power
law distributions in statistical measurements of cultural popularity).
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Table 2: Comparison Between Expected and Observed Frequencies of
Discrepancies for c = 0.181 and k = 11.
E 404 55 (6.5%)
0 9322 (37.9%)
_40 69 57 (6.7%)
The null hypothesis that the observed discrepancies are a
random sample taken from f is amenable to testing with the chi-
square goodness-of-fit test. 73 Following standard procedures, in Table
2 we have combined categories of expected size less than five in each
tail.74 For these data, we find '2 = 6.984 with four degrees of freedom,
giving a two-tailed P value of 0.1368., 5 The hypothesized distribution
f with the specified parameters is, therefore, a good enough fit for the
observed data that we cannot find a statistical basis for rejecting the
null hypothesis. 76 A fortiori, we cannot find a statistical basis for
rejecting our less specific conjecture that Facebook's database
employs both rounding (modulo 20) and discrete Laplace noise-
addition mechanisms.77
Finally, we observe that independently generated (as opposed to
cached) responses from a database employing rounding (modulo 20)
with k = 11 and DL(-exp(0.181)) noise addition mechanisms tend to
vary more widely than we found among Facebook's responses to
73. For an introduction and illustration of the chi-square goodness-of-fit test, see
generally RONALD A. FISHER, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RESEARCH WORKERS
(1958).
74. See, e.g., DAVID R. ANDERSON, DENNIS J. SWEENEY & THOMAS A. WILLIAMS,
STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 489 (2011).
75. See Compare Observed and Expected Frequencies, GRAPHPAD SOFTWARE, http://
www.graphpad.comlquickcalcs/chisquaredl.cfm (last visited May 4, 2012) (providing an
online tool for performing the chi-square goodness-of-fit test for a discrete distribution
with up to twenty categories).
76. Cf. ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 74, at 487-90 (providing an analogous example
of the chi-square goodness-of-fit test and concluding from a calculated P value of 0.1404
that the hypothesized distribution cannot be rejected).
77. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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repeated queries. The probability of any five independently
generated responses from such a database being equal is at most
0.409, achieved when the true value of the reach statistic is a multiple
of 20. Performing similar calculations for the levels of agreement
among Facebook's responses to twenty-five repeated queries (given
at least one disagreement among the first five) yields the expected
frequencies in Table 3.
Table 3: Comparison Between Observed and Expected Levels of
Agreement Among the Facebook Database's Responses to Repeated
Queries78
23 c of 25 65 1,579 (4.8%)
21 of 25 1 4,289 (13. 1%)1
For these data, we have X2 = 44,963.972 with five degrees of
freedom, giving a two-tailed P value of less than 0.0001. 79 Assuming
Facebook's database uses the hypothesized rounding and Laplace
noise addition mechanisms, our findings in Table 1 provide a strong
statistical basis for rejecting the null hypothesis that each of
Facebook's responses to a repeated query is independently
generated.
In summary, observations of Facebook's responses to an
extensive range of potentially privacy-sensitive audience reach
queries yield the following conclusions. First, the observed magnitude
of discrepancies implies Facebook's database is not merely rounding
the true audience reach statistics to the nearest twenty. Second, the
observed distributions of discrepancies are consistent with our
hypothesis that the database, in addition to rounding, is using a
78. The data for expected queries assumes that the responses are generated
independently using the hypothesized rounding and Laplace noise addition mechanisms.
The percentages do not add to 100% due to rounding.
79. See Compare Observed and Expected Frequencies, supra note 75.
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(discrete8') Laplace noise addition mechanism. Finally, the observed
frequencies of responses to repeated queries strongly support our
hypothesis that any actual use of these hypothesized mechanisms is
performed in combination with short-term caching.
B. Assessing Facebook's Apparent Solution
With advertising accounting for 83% of Facebook's worldwide
revenues of $3.711 billion in 2011,81 there can be little question that
Facebook's advertising reach database provides a sufficient level of
utility to advertisers to allow them to plan their campaigns with
confidence. The more challenging question is the extent to which the
level of differential privacy achieved by Facebook's ad targeting
database can be extended to more general contexts.
As a possible framework for resolving privacy-utility tradeoffs in
general, differential privacy has received mixed reviews from legal
scholars and computer scientists. Some computer scientists have
praised differential privacy as "a major step in the right direction."82
Dwork asserts that differential privacy "has, for the first time, placed
private data analysis on a strong mathematical foundation."83 Critics,
however, contend that differentially private mechanisms are
impracticable in computationally intensive contexts' and place undue
burdens on both the disclosers and recipients of data.8 Such
mechanisms are not as intuitive or simple as traditional procedures
for removing specific data elements such as name, date of birth, and
80. See supra text accompanying note 57.
81. See Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-I) 40, 55 (Feb. 1, 2012),
available at http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000119312512034517/d287954dsl
.htm.
82. Narayanan & Shmatikov, supra note 42, at 26.
83. See Dwork, supra note 43, at 95.
84. See Rathindra Sarathy & Krishnamurty Muralidhar, Evaluating Laplace Noise
Addition to Satisfy Differential Privacy for Numeric Data, 4 TRANSACTIONS ON DATA
PRIVACY 1, 15-16 (2011) [hereinafter Evaluating Laplace Noise Addition] (concluding
that the use of Laplace noise additions as a differential privacy measure results either in
lack of privacy or lack of utility, or both); Rathindra Sarathy & Krish Muralidhar, Some
Additional Insights on Applying Differential Privacy to Numeric Data, PROCS. OF 2010
CONF. ON PRIVACY IN STAT. DATABASES 210, 212 (2010) [hereinafter Some Additional
Insights] (finding that Laplace noise addition is suited only to numerical data where upper
and lower bounds of query responses are known in advance).
85. See Xiao et al., supra note 46, at 1200-01(noting that Dwork's mechanism can
potentially decrease the utility of data for researchers, especially with large data sets used
in populations research); see also Ohm, supra note 6, at 1757 (contending that noise
addition mechanisms require "complex calculations that can be costly to perform").
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street address,86 and can require custom programming prior to initial
use of the data.87 Dismissing differential privacy as a possible solution
to the utility-privacy tradeoff,' Ohm concludes that "[u]tility and
privacy are, at bottom, two goals at war with one another. In order to
be useful, anonymized data must be imperfectly anonymous."'89
This Facebook case study brings some needed concreteness to
this discussion by providing an opportunity to assess the effectiveness
and practicality of what we believe to be the most commercially
successful implementation of a differentially private database system.
In the remainder of this Section, we discuss four system-specific
considerations pertaining to this assessment.
1. The Size of E
By their nature, the above statistical tests say nothing about the
probability that Facebook is actually using DL (exp(E)) noise
addition, a mechanism that has been shown to achieve c-differential
privacy; we have shown only that the database's observed responses
are not improbable if Facebook is indeed employing such a
mechanism. The estimate c - 0.181 represents the specific mechanism
that provides the strongest support for this conclusion. 9°
Assuming that Facebook is indeed using our hypothesized
mechanism or something close to it, we have no basis for an a priori
view as to whether c ; 0.181 is "good enough" privacy for Facebook's
users. What we can say is that by definition, 0.181-differential privacy
implies a tolerance for up to a 20% change in the probability
distribution of a mechanism resulting from the inclusion or exclusion
of a user in the database. As Dwork notes:
86. Deidentification to comply, for example, with the HIPAA Privacy Rule is a
straightforward matter of "suppressing" or "generalizing" personally identifiable
information, such as names, addresses, and social security numbers. See Ohm, supra note
6, at 1711-16.
87. Ease of use is an important consideration. Studies have shown, for example, that
uncertainty over computer technology has kept many doctors and healthcare practices
from participating in national programs to speed the move to electronic health records.
See, e.g., Nir Menachemi et al., Florida Doctors Seeing Medicaid Patients Show Broad
Interest in Federal Incentive for Adopting Electronic Health Records, 30 HEALTH AFF.
1461, 1464-67 (2011) (showing that, despite high interest in participating in federal
incentive programs, doctors not participating cited uncertainty about technology, lack of
specialized staff to implement technology, and the cost of new technology).
88. See Ohm, supra note 6, at 1756-58 (discussing limitations of differentially private
mechanisms and other technological advances).
89. See id. at 1752.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 71-77.
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The choice of c is essentially a social question .... That said, we
tend to think of e as, say, 0.01, 0.1, or in some cases, In2 or In3.
If the probability that some bad event will occur is very small, it
might be tolerable to increase it by such factors as 2 or 3, while
if the probability is already felt to be close to unacceptable,
then an increase by a factor of e0'01  1.01 might be tolerable,
while an increase of e, or even only e° ', would be intolerable. 91
In assessing whether 20% is a tolerable perturbation or risks
revealing too much probabilistic information about the true value of a
user reach statistic, it must also be kept in mind that the parameter E
is defined with respect to the behavior of the database in responding
to a single query. As Dwork acknowledges and others have
emphasized in critical responses to Dwork's work, the guarantee of
differential privacy can rapidly deteriorate when confronted with a
long series of queries.92 If such degradation proves to be problematic,
Facebook has available to it the technological option of restricting
would-be advertisers to a number of queries deemed reasonably
necessary to identify an appropriate target audience for their ad, and
denying queries far in excess of that number as an abuse of the terms
of service.
9 3
2. Rounding and Caching
Facebook's apparent ancillary practices of caching responses to
queries repeated over the short term and of rounding its database
outputs to multiples of twenty have the salutary property that they
preserve the guarantee of 8-differential privacy. 94 The rounding
91. Dwork, supra note 48, at 3.
92. See id. at 4; see also Evaluating Laplace Noise Addition, supra note 84, 9-15
(demonstrating vulnerability of Laplace noise addition to a "tracker attack" involving
multiple queries).
93. See generally Warning: Blocked from Using Feature, FACEBOOK, https://www
.facebook.com/help/?page=205619719473732 (click on the arrow next to "Why have I been
blocked from using certain features?") (last visited May 4, 2012) (explaining that a user
may be blocked from using certain features when Facebook determines that a user has
been using a feature at rate that "is likely to be abusive," even though Facebook is unable
to "provide any specifics on the rate limits that we enforce"). Fortunately, for purposes of
the present study, Facebook has not taken such steps. But cf. Statement of Rights and
Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last updated Apr. 26,
2011) ("You will not collect users' content or information, or otherwise access Facebook,
using automated means (such as harvesting bots, robots, spiders, or scrapers) without our
permission.").
94. To see this, note that for all D,, D2, the condition,
Pr[r(K(D)) E S]!< exp(s) x Pr[r(K(D2 )) E S]
is met whenever
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discipline is also consistent with conventional understandings of
precision and significant digits;95 thus, by consistently outputting
round numbers, the database tends to reinforce Facebook's notice to
paying advertisers that its reported reach statistics are only estimates.
It is less clear whether these practices actually provide any
privacy protections to Facebook's users beyond that already afforded
by Laplace noise addition. In a 1989 survey paper on privacy
mechanisms for statistical databases, computer scientists Nabil Adam
and John Wortmann concluded: "Generally, rounding is not
considered an effective security-control method. But combining
rounding with other security-control methods seems to be a
promising avenue."96 Facebook's practice of reporting all user groups
of less than forty as "fewer than 20 people" does seem to impede
some simple and direct kinds of privacy attacks against individuals
and small groups without significant loss of utility.
Symmetric noise addition mechanisms may be vulnerable to
"averaging attacks," wherein an attacker simply repeats the same
query and averages the responses; the Central Limit Theorem assures
that the average will tend to converge to the true value.97 Caching of
responses to statistical queries may be deployed as an adjunct to noise
addition mechanisms to defeat averaging attacks. As with other
privacy techniques that require the logging of queries, there are
significant time and storage overheads involved in storing and
processing the accumulated logs.98 Facebook could mitigate some of
these overheads by maintaining its logs only over the short term,
relying on rapid ongoing changes in its user population and their
profile information to defend against averaging attacks over the
longer term, and using probabilistic caching methods that improve
efficiency at the cost of occasional cache misses. Such strategies may
already be in use and reflected in the data in Table 1.
Pr[K(DI) E r-'(S)] < exp(e) x Pr[K(D 2) e r-'(S)]
where r'(S) denotes the preimage of S under the rounding mapping r; the latter condition
follows from the definition of differential privacy. See supra text accompanying note 48.
95. See, e.g., NICHOLAS J. HIGHAM, ACCURACY AND STABILITY OF NUMERICAL
ALGORITHMS 3-6 (2002) (explaining concepts of significant digits and precision in
numerical analysis).
96. Nabil R. Adam & John C. Wortmann, Security-Control Methods for Statistical
Databases: A Comparative Study, 21 ASS'N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY COMPUTING
SURVS. 515, 543 (1989).
97. See id.; Dwork, supra note 48, at 3.
98. See Adam & Wortmann, supra note 96, at 527.
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Still, Dwork doubts that caching can provide a strong defense
against averaging attacks:
We do not recommend having the [database] curator record
queries and their responses so that if a query is issued more
than once the response can be replayed: If the query language is
sufficiently rich, then semantic equivalence of two syntactically
different queries is undecidable; even if the query language is
not so rich, the devastating attacks demonstrated by Dinur and
Nissim... pose completely random and unrelated queries.99
Despite Dwork's computability-theoretic reservations, Facebook
may still be able to use short-term caching effectively in practice to
defeat averaging attacks. Facebook should be able to detect
semantically equivalent queries, because its advertising interface does
not seem to support a very rich query language. For example, it seems
to provide only one way to specify the set of 50- to 51-year-old North
Carolina Facebook users interested in Alzheimer's disease. Also,
Dinur and Nissim's "devastating attacks" rely on the attacker's ability
to perform a very long series of queries,"°° which Facebook can defeat
through technological restrictions. 1 1 While more study is needed to
determine to what extent rounding and caching may contribute as
adjuncts to Laplace noise addition generally in the practical
implementation of differential privacy guarantees, Facebook's
apparent use of these technologies in this specific context seems
relatively easy to justify.
3. Extensibility to Social Network Data
The strength of our hypothesized privacy mechanism for
Facebook's advertising reach database critically depends on the fact
that it is a count database; this assures that Af= 1, and thus p =
exp(-c). A database allowing queries about the characteristics of a
group of c members could have Af= c, so that the guarantee of E-
99. Dwork, supra note 48, at 3 n.1 (citing Irit Dinur & Kobbi Nissim, Revealing
Information While Preserving Privacy, 22 ASS'N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY SPECIAL
INT. GROUP ON MGMT. OF DATA-SPECIAL INT. GROUP ON ALGORITHMS &
COMPUTATION THEORY-SPECIAL INT. GROUP ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYMP. ON
PRINCIPLES OF DATABASE SYS. 202, 202-10 (2003)).
100. See Irit Dinur & Kobbi Nissim, Revealing Information While Preserving Privacy,
22 ASS'N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY SPECIAL INT. GROUP ON MGMT. OF DATA-
SPECIAL INT. GROUP ON ALGORITHMS & COMPUTATION THEORY-SPECIAL INT. GROUP
ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYMP. ON PRINCIPLES OF DATABASE SYS. 202,202 (2003)
(using nlog2 n queries to infer the contents of a database, where n is the size of the
database).
101. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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differential privacy could assure only an exp(Ec) bound on dilation of
the probability distribution of responses due to the inclusion or
exclusion of a single participant's data.
To date, Facebook's advertising interface does not allow
targeting to a user based on characteristics of the user's friends.
Allowing queries to include friends' characteristics, however, would
increase the value of Af to the maximum size of a user's friends list,
currently 5,000 friends.1°2 While Dwork notes that an exp( c) bound
on probability dilation "may be tolerable for small c,"' 3 c = 5,000 is
not "small," and exp(O.181 x 5,000) is astronomical.
The observation that allowing queries involving friends'
characteristics would effectively vitiate differential privacy provides
further support for our hypothesis that Facebook is deliberately
addressing its privacy-utility tradeoffs through the implementation of
differential privacy mechanisms. Disallowing such queries represents
a meaningful sacrifice of utility. For example, an airline presently
cannot target an advertisement for discount fares from RDU to LAX
to Raleigh-Durham area Facebook users who have 10 or more friends
in Los Angeles. Privacy concerns provide a rational explanation for
why Facebook has been willing to forego offering such a unique and
potentially lucrative extension to its targeted ad platform. 1'
We have not examined Facebook's privacy practices with respect
to the social network data it maintains; i.e., the graph-theoretic
pattern of links formed between pairs of users who have identified
themselves as friends on Facebook. We simply note here that
Facebook routinely releases actual, personally identifiable social
network data at the individual user level. Even though Facebook
provides a setting that allows users to keep their friends list private, 1°5
friends lists are public by default,"6 and Facebook allows third-party
software developers to crawl the public links of its social network
102. See, e.g., Aimee Lee Ball, Are 5,001 Facebook Friends One Too Many?, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 2010, at STI (discussing Facebook's 5,000-friend limit).
103. See Dwork, supra note 48, at 3.
104. See infra text accompanying note 123 (noting the alignment of Facebook's
economic interests with its users' privacy interests).
105. See Edit Profile, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/editprofile.php?sk
=relationships (last visited May 4, 2012) (providing a dropdown menu for visibility of
friends list when logged in to Facebook).
106. See Jared Newman, Facebook Beefs Up Security, Makes Captchas More Annoying,
PCWORLD (Jan. 26, 2011, 11:43 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/217844/ facebook
beefs-up-security-makes-captchas-more-annoying.html ("In Facebook's push to make
users share more personal information, friends lists are now one of the things Facebook
makes public by default.").
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graph. 107 Thus, to the best of our knowledge, Facebook has made no
effort to implement a differentially private mechanism to protect its
social network data. 108
In describing how the adoption and performance of Facebook's
hypothesized privacy mechanisms may be predicated on various
system-specific considerations, the preceding discussion might call
into question the general applicability of differential privacy as a
response to the reidentification threat. The following Part addresses
the applicability of differential privacy technologies to other
situations and ways that this standard for privacy could be
incorporated into the law.
III. EXTENDING THE APPLICABILITY OF DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
The Facebook case study suggests a number of criteria for
identifying contexts where the notion of differential privacy can play
a useful role in standards of compliance with privacy laws. Although
other solutions to the reidentification threat may also hold promise, 1°9
differential privacy can be an appropriate tool when these criteria are
met. This approach can be flexible. When the criteria are present, a
differential privacy standard may be appropriate; and when such a
standard is appropriate, fulfillment of the standard may be recognized
as evidence of compliance. Where privacy law already accommodates
a fairly loose standard, such as a requirement of anonymization
107. See Eric Eldon, Analysis: Some Facebook Privacy Issues Are Real, Some Are Not,
INSIDE NETWORK (May 11, 2010), http://www.insidefacebook.com/2010/05/11/analysis-
some-facebook-privacy-issues-are-real-some-are-not/ (noting that public friends lists are
"available to third parties through the Graph API, for services like search").
108. Perhaps this is for the best because a design for such a mechanism has thus far
eluded computer science researchers. See Vibhor Rastogi et al., Relationship Privacy:
Output Perturbation for Queries with Joins, 28 ASS'N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY
SPECIAL INT. GROUP ON MGMT. DATA-SPECIAL INT. GROUP ON ALGORITHMS &
COMPUTATION THEORY-SPECIAL INT. GROUP ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYMP. ON
PRINCIPLES OF DATABASE SYS. 107, 108-09 (2009) (noting that previous mechanisms "do
not ... provide quantitative guarantees of privacy and utility" and presenting a novel
approach that does not guarantee "E-indistinguishability" but only "a somewhat weaker
adversarial privacy").
109. See Gellman, supra note 36, at 47 (suggesting that legislatures establish "a
statutory framework that will allow the data disclosers and the data recipients to agree
voluntarily on externally enforceable terms that provide privacy protections for the data
subjects"); Ohm, supra note 6, at 1759 (urging regulators to focus on situations in which
"harm is likely and ... outweighs the benefits of unfettered information flow" and
regulate only those situations); Schwartz & Solove, supra note 9, at 1879 (arguing for a
privacy standard called "PII 2.0," which places private information on a "continuum of
risk" so that privacy laws can be more specific in terms of legal protections for various
types of information).
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without specificity of a particular methodology, the notion of
differential privacy can fit into the existing law. Where privacy
compliance is a function of specific rule-oriented actions, a guarantee
of differential privacy might be deemed to satisfy such rules (thereby
elevating substance over form) or new regulation or legislation might
be required.
Criteria for appropriateness of implementation of differential
privacy are based on the Facebook advertiser audience reach case
study and on limitations on the technology described by computer
science experts. Some kinds of data sets and some uses of those data
sets are better candidates for differentially private mechanisms than
others. The best opportunities will have the following characteristics:
(1) The interest in privacy is strong, and the risk of
reidentification is significant.
(2) The information to be released is in a database.
(3) The database is large.
(4) The uses of the database can tolerate some distortion in the
information from the database.
(5) The uses of the database do not involve study of outliers,
other individuals, or relationship networks between or among
individuals.
(6) The upper and lower ranges of numerical information to be
sought from the database can be anticipated.
A. Strong Privacy Interest/Significant Reidentification Risk
As a first criterion, a strong privacy interest is necessary because
differential privacy mechanisms do trade some utility of data for
privacy. An assessment of the relative weight of privacy and utility
interests is appropriate. This balancing assessment involves both
technical and normative evaluations, including an evaluation of the
current requirements under the law. Differential privacy mechanisms
introduce random "noise" that will result in rounding of numerical
answers to queries to the database, so the interest in privacy must be
strong enough to offset this reduction in accuracy of the information.
In addition, current implementations require an investment in
software to create an interactive query interface between the discloser
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and the recipient of data. As standard software packages become
available, this particular barrier may be lowered." °
The underlying assumption in this strong privacy interest
criterion is that the risk of reidentification is significant. If the risk of
reidentification is insignificant, the privacy mechanisms may not need
to be robust. Schwartz and Solove make this argument,"' as does
Jane Yakowitz. 11' However, if one accepts Ohm's argument and that
of many computer scientists,113 determination of which data elements
carry the most risk is challenging. Even if one might survey existing
auxiliary data sets to determine which data elements would be most
vulnerable to reidentifying linkage, this survey cannot anticipate
future publicly accessible data sets.114 Whether a data discloser is
responsible for anticipating future risks of linkage with future data
sets is an important question. Privacy advocates have warned about
the dangers of unanticipated uses of information and futility of most
remedies once sensitive information is revealed." 5 The potential for
future reidentification should be a factor in determining the strength
of the privacy interest or privacy risk, but it should not prevent
consideration of other factors.
In the Facebook advertising reach database, the privacy interests
are strong and the risk of reidentification is significant. There may be
multiple "privacy" interests. First, Facebook has enticed users to post
vast amounts of personal information,11 6 and requires an accurate
110. See, e.g., McSherry, supra note 47, at 89 (describing a program he has dubbed
PINQ, for Privacy Integrated Queries, which he says does not require a high level of
computer expertise by users).
111. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 9, at 1877-79.
112. See Yakowitz, supra note 36, at 45-46.
113. See Ohm, supra note 6, at 1742-45 (drawing on computer science research to
argue that the "list of potential PII [personally identifiable information] will never stop
growing until it includes everything").
114. See Latanya Sweeney, k-Anonymity: A Model for Protecting Privacy, 10 INT'L J.
UNCERTAINTY, FUZZINESS & KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYs. 557, 563-65 (2002) (describing
the difficulty of measuring reidentification risk for particular data elements).
115. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND
PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 42-49 (2007) (discussing the permanence of access to
information once released through the Internet).
116. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, Why Facebook Is After Your Kids, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com12011/10/16/magazine/why-facebook-is-after-your-
kids.html (noting that Facebook's default settings allow more sharing of information than
many users realize and that most users do not adjust privacy settings to make them more
protective); Jessica Guynn, Facebook Drawing Fire over Privacy, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27,
2011, at B1 (describing Facebook's "passive sharing" services, which allow third-party
applications to share "every action users take" on the site).
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name, gender, address, and date of birth of all subscribers," 7 while
promising not to share that information in certain ways." 8 Although
the privacy policies and access settings that Facebook offers its users
are criticized as complex, confusing, and subject to change," 9
Facebook does make some promises. These promises indicate that
Facebook seems to feel that the privacy concerns of its users are an
important inducement for getting and keeping that customer base.
These promises also mean that Facebook may have privacy
obligations under contract, 120 state consumer protection laws, 121 and
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which protects
against "unfair or deceptive acts or practices.' 1 22 Finally, Facebook
has its own interest in protecting the identities of its users from its
advertisers. If Facebook were to provide information to advertisers
that could be used to create independent targeted marketing lists,
these advertisers would no longer need Facebook. Facebook's own
interests in protecting its proprietary information overlap with its
customers' interests, forming a strong privacy interest. 123 Facebook's
database has many data elements that could be linked to outside
information, so it is likely that full access to its data, even with many
identifying elements suppressed, would produce reidentification
threats. Thus, Facebook's release of advertising reach data presents a
context in which the first criterion for differential privacy is met.
117. See Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 93 (prohibiting users from
"provid[ing] any false personal information on Facebook").
118. According to Facebook, "We only provide data to our advertising partners or
customers after we have removed your name or any other personally identifying
information from it, or have combined it with other people's data in a way that it is no
longer associated with you." Data Use Policy, supra note 15.
119. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1168
(2009) (explaining that "one of the most disruptive things that a social network site can do
is to change the ground rules of how personal information flows").
120. See Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635, 1639-
50 (2011).
121. For a chart of state consumer protection laws, see Managed Care State Laws and
Regulations, Including Consumer and Provider Protections, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14320#comprehensive
(last updated Sept. 2011) (listing comprehensive consumer rights statute citations in Table
6).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
123. Privacy scholars have struggled with definitions for privacy and confidentiality for
quite some time. This analysis of strength of privacy interests does not give a nuanced
treatment to the concepts. The key point here is that any type of privacy interest, and the
overlap of multiple such interests, can suggest an opportunity to implement mechanisms to
support differential privacy. For scholarship on defining privacy and privacy harms, see
generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008) and Daniel J. Solove, A
Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006).
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B. Information Must Be from a Database
The second criterion for differential privacy is that the
information to be released is in a database. The mechanisms now in
development to support differential privacy were created to address
the threats to privacy from the sharing of information contained in
databases. These mechanisms have broad applicability to databases,
but they do not address a number of other privacy concerns. Most
fundamentally, differential privacy cannot "put the horse back in the
barn": it cannot be used to solve the problem of reidentification based
solely on data that is already publicly available.124 Beyond this
problem, Facebook has been embroiled in a number of privacy
controversies that could not be covered by the interactive query
programs that have been developed to prevent reidentification of
individuals. In one instance, Facebook was criticized for failure to
prevent advertisers from receiving detailed information about
Facebook users who clicked on an advertisement. l 5 Facebook
corrected this problem, but the query mechanism K(D) at the heart of
the definition of differential privacy was not applicable. 126
C. The Database Must Be Large
The third criterion for implementing differential privacy is that
the database must be large enough that the introduction of
randomization nonetheless yields useful information. If the database
is small, the noise necessary for masking the presence of any one
individual is likely to destroy the utility of the information shared.
With more than 800 million active users as of December 2011,127
124. Alessandro Acquisti and Ralph Gross have reported that using only publicly
accessible data and face recognition software, they could predict complete Social Security
numbers for 8.5% of the people born in the United States between 1989 and 2003.
Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Predicting Social Security Numbers from Public
Data, 106 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 10975, 10975 (2009).
125. See, e.g., Jim Puzzanghera & Jessica Guynn, Study: User Data Sharing Is
Pervasive, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2011, at B1 (describing new research that showed how
some websites transfer personal information to advertisers and other fhird parties every
time users log onto the sites).
126. Matt Jones, Protecting Privacy with Referrers, FACEBOOK NOTES (May 24, 2010,
11:24 PM), http:/www.facebook.comlnotes/facebook-engineeringprotecting-privacy-with-
referrers/392382738919 (announcing a fix to "an unintentional oversight" in the data
shared with advertisers when Facebook users clicked on ads from within Facebook).
Because this practice was contrary to Facebock's promise, the FTC identified it as
offensive to the Federal Trade Commission Act prohibition against "deceptive trade
practices." See Complaint at 13, Facebook, Inc., No. 0923184 (F.T.C. Nov. 29, 2011), 2011
WL 7096348 at *8.
127. Newsroom: -Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx
?NewsAreald=22 (last visited May 4, 2012).
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Facebook's advertising reach database clearly satisfies this
requirement. 128 National- and state-level census databases represent
other clear examples. 129 Just what number of records is large enough
is a function both of the information in the database and of the type
of information sought from the database. But, in general, data bulk is
an important prerequisite for the implementation of differentially
private database mechanisms.
D. Use of the Data Must Be Able To Tolerate Some Distortion
The fourth criterion is that the uses of the data must be able to
tolerate some distortion. Because current mechanisms for supporting
differential privacy function by introducing noise, precision in the
released data is not possible. 3' Facebook advertisers at least appear
to be satisfied with reach statistics that are variable and imprecise.
Given Facebook's dominance in the social networking market, one
might question whether advertisers are truly satisfied with the utility
of these counts or whether their inferior bargaining position leads
them to accept inferior information. The reality, however, is that
advertisers do accept this quality of information, so the utility must be
adequate for commercial purposes.
Other uses of large data sets might not accommodate even small
inaccuracies in the data. For example, disclosures from census data
that relied on introduction of noise have been criticized for containing
too much noise for some types of analysis.' Certain studies of health
care data from hospitals or from insurance companies might require
perfect reporting of factors that differential privacy would obscure.
13 2
And, if Facebook had meaningful competition for advertisers, it
might be pressured to provide more accurate reach data to secure
advertisers' business.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Johnnes Gehrke, Technical Perspective: Programming with Differential
Privacy, COMM. Ass'N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY, Sept. 2010, at 88, 88 (citation
omitted).
130. See Evaluating Laplace Noise Addition, supra note 84, at 9-15.
131. Yakowitz, supra note 36, at 46-47 (noting that introduction of noise in samples of
census data have resulted in demographic research errors).
132. See Douglas Peddicord et al., A Proposal to Protect Privacy of Health Information
While Accelerating Comparative Effectiveness Research, 29 HEALTH AFF. 2082, 2083-84
(2010) (asserting that health data deidentified through customized and expensive
statistical methods, presumably differential privacy methods, may meet the needs of the
initial research query but would be "virtually impossible to combine with other
deidentified data for new comparative effectiveness study").
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E. Data Use Must Not Focus on Outliers
The fifth criterion for adopting a differential privacy standard
precludes the use of the database to study outliers because that kind
of information is inconsistent with differential privacy's goal of
preventing identification of any one individual.133 Differential privacy
would obscure the outliers in any data set. In the Facebook advertiser
example, some advertisers might prefer to have finer granularity in
audience reach data, including knowing if they have selected audience
reach characteristics that target a very small group or even one
person. Advertisers seeking access to users of Facebook, though, have
settled for less accurate feedback that specifically precludes the
reporting of one or even a small number of individuals meeting
advertiser-selected characteristics. In other contexts, data utility
might require the study of outliers, so randomization technologies
used to achieve differential privacy would be too severe a burden on
utility of the data. For example, if a researcher of health data were
interested in tracking individuals who were oddly immune to a
particular pathogen, differential privacy might prevent identification
of these small sets that could identify individuals.
At least for now, the obscuring of outliers through differential
privacy technologies would also preclude the study of relationship
networks between or among individuals. Noise-addition techniques
that achieve differential privacy in statistical databases are generally
unsuitable for reporting on relationships, essentially because each
individual obscured produces ripple effects in the database and in the
information reported. 134 Computer scientists have begun to develop
privacy mechanisms specifically for social networks, but have not yet
achieved the combination of reasonable utility and differential
privacy.13 As noted above, Facebook does not appear to have
attempted to implement a differentially private mechanism to protect
its social network data, but instead shares this information with third-
party software developers.136 Similarly, a database with genetic
133. Dwork, supra note 18, at 50:10-51:15 (noting the impossibility of studying outliers,
social networking, or genetics through queries to a database using differential privacy
technologies because by definition no individual may be identified).
134. See Dwork, supra note 43, at 91-95; supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 108.
136. See supra text accompanying note 107; see also Data Use Policy, supra note 15
("When you go to a game or application, or connect with a website using Facebook
Platform, we give the game, application, or website (sometimes referred to as just
'Applications' or 'Apps') your User ID, as well your friends' User IDs (or your friend
list).").
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information that necessarily links individuals could not be well
utilized if differential privacy were applied. 137
F. Smallest and Largest Potential Numerical Answers Must Be
Anticipated
The sixth criterion for the applicability of differentially private
database mechanisms is specifically directed to Laplace noise addition
and requires that all potential queries have a priori upper and lower
bounds. This requirement is trivially met for count databases.'38 For
example, in Facebook's advertising reach database, all queries take
the form "How many users... ," so the lower bound is zero, and the
upper bound is the number of Facebook users, a number that the
database mechanism can monitor. Numerical databases where the
results of queries can be of arbitrary magnitude are problematic,
however, because there is no way to determine in advance the value
of Af, and, therefore, no way to identify the Laplace distribution Lap
(Af/E) from which the random noise is to be taken.'39
G. Differential Privacy As Best Practice or Evidence of Privacy
Compliance
Facebook's advertising reach database can serve as an exemplar
for the adoption of differential privacy technologies in certain
circumstances and recognition of differential privacy technologies as
best practices for or evidence of compliance with privacy law. When
the six criteria are met, as in the Facebook case study, differential
privacy technologies can protect against reidentification without loss
of utility. A number of kinds of data sets appear to exhibit our criteria
in regulated areas such as health care, video rental, student records,
and some government databases.
Explicit incorporation of differential privacy as a standard in
privacy law would not be simple because U.S. privacy law is not
simple. U.S. privacy law is a collection of piecemeal laws, including
federal and state statutes that are largely sectoral, regulations that are
standard- or rule-based, common law claims that vary by jurisdiction,
and somewhat uncertain constitutional protections. Further,
137. See Rastogi et al., supra note 108, at 110 (demonstrating that joins lead to less
accurate query results when using an c-indistinguishable algorithm; Dwork, supra note 18
at 51:10-51:15 (explaining that study of outliers, social networks, and genetics is impossible
using techniques designed to achieve differential privacy).
138. Cf supra text accompanying note 55 (discussing the suitability of Laplace noise
addition for count databases).
139. See Some Additional Insights, supra note 84, at 212.
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incorporation of differential privacy as the standard may not be
appropriate in some circumstances. A variety of approaches to
privacy and prevention of reidentification are promoted by
statisticians and computer scientists, 14' as well as by legal scholars.14
Differential privacy may, however, fit within existing privacy law
requirements, even though these laws largely draw on assumptions
that reidentification of individuals would be prevented through the
suppression of a limited number of data elements. Recognition of
differential privacy as a best practice for or evidence of compliance
with privacy requirements can be most easily incorporated into areas
of law that are grounded in standards, rather than a rule that might
outline particular data elements for nondisclosure.'42
The law governing privacy in social networking is largely
standard-based, so this area is a strong candidate for incorporation of
differential privacy. Contract, state, and federal consumer protection
statutes, and negligence and privacy torts are generally amenable to
acknowledging the evolution of best practices. When a social network
makes a promise to users through its privacy policy, general promises
to not share identifying information could be found to meet best
practices when differential privacy techniques are implemented.
143
State consumer protection laws, 144 which often mirror the Federal
Trade Commission Act's protection against unfair and deceptive
trade practices, could also recognize differential privacy technologies
as evidence of fulfillment of promises to protect individuals'
privacy. 45 Similarly, a social network relying on differential privacy
techniques should be able to defend itself against privacy torts and
negligence claims for failure to take reasonable or effective steps to
140. Jerome Reiter et al., Panel 2: Statistical Disclosure Control and HIPAA Privacy
Rule Protections, HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES WORKSHOP ON THE HIPAA PRIVACY
RULE'S DE-IDENTIFICATION STANDARD 1:26 (Mar. 8,2010), http://www.hhshipaaprivacy
.com/conferenceagenda.php?cid=1 (reviewing different approaches to balancing privacy
and utility of data in health care and other industries and concluding that, at least with
current technologies, "One-Size Will Not Fit All!").
141. See Schwartz & Solove, supra note 9, at 1870-72 (arguing for flexibility in the law
to address rapidly changing social practices and technologies and to match differences in
the types of behavior or information being regulated).
142. See id. at 1828-35 (categorizing privacy laws into two types of standard-oriented
approaches and another category based on rules for protecting personally identifying
information).
143. Cf. Hartzog, supra note 120, at 1635-39 (reviewing cases accepting website privacy
policies as contracts and arguing that privacy settings on websites should also be enforced
as contracts).
144. See supra note 121.
145. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006) ("[U]nfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.").
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protect against reidentification of data that was promised to be kept
nonidentifying. All of these areas of law are flexible enough to
recognize differential privacy technologies as evidence of compliance
with privacy promises.
Some other privacy laws, such as the federal Video Privacy
Protection Act of 1988,14 are based on standards that could also
readily accept differential privacy applications.147 This Act protects
the privacy of video rentals and purchases by prohibiting videotape
service providers from disclosing "personally identifiable
information," which is defined as "information which identifies a
person."'" Student records and health records are protected under
two statutes that may also incorporate differential privacy as evidence
of compliance. 49 These statutes acknowledge the reidentification
threat and prohibit disclosure that could be used to identify
individuals."' 0
But, even if standard-oriented privacy laws adopted differential
privacy as evidence of compliance, not all uses of those protected data
sets would be served by differential privacy. The criteria for
applicability exclude some uses that require more accuracy and access
to outlier information. For example, computer programmers
interested in the contest to develop the best improvement to the
Netflix recommendation system might not find enough utility in an
interactive query form of access to the customer database. Similarly,
medical researchers might not find differentially private access to
health care data sufficiently granular to advance knowledge of
146. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006)).
147. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (forbidding video tape service providers from disclosing
personally identifiable information, but not requiring a certain method to achieve this
privacy protection); Family Education Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)
(2006) (stating that institutions possessing personally identifiable information of students
must ensure that the information is not disclosed to third parties); Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d) (2006) (explaining that the
Secretary shall set forth security standards for the protection of private health
information, but not requiring that a specific means of privacy protection be utilized); 47
U.S.C. § 551(b)(1), (c)(1) (2006) ("[A] cable operator shall not disclose personally
identifiable information concerning any subscriber without the prior written or electronic
consent of the subscriber concerned and shall take such actions as are necessary to prevent
unauthorized access to such information by a person other than the subscriber or cable
operator.").
148. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(3).
149. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d).
150. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2(d)(6)(B).
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prevention and treatment."' In the Netflix case, the normative answer
may be that Netflix may not conduct another contest that would
release customer data to the public, making reidentification likely. 15 2
Medical researchers, on the other hand, might be allowed more
generous access to protected health care data than differential privacy
would support, so long as they agreed to limitations on the use of that
data.151
CONCLUSION
Facebook's apparent implementation of a commercially
successful, differentially private database mechanism provides hope
that in at least some contexts, the law can recognize best practices
that go beyond traditional anonymization techniques to better protect
privacy while maintaining utility of data. Differential privacy does not
provide a solution to all problems of balancing privacy and utility, but
privacy law should seek to enlist all the power it has to offer in the
perpetual battle against the threat of reidentification.
151. See Douglas Peddicord et al., A Proposal to Protect Privacy of Health Information
While Accelerating Comparative Effectiveness Research, 29 HEALTH AFF. 2082, 2083-84
(2010) (advocating that medical researchers be given full access to health care records and
allowed to link data sets to conduct effective research).
152. As discussed earlier, Netflix did in fact cancel its second contest in the course of
settling a lawsuit and an FTC investigation. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
153. See Gellman, supra note 36, at 58-59 (proposing new legislation that would
support contracts allowing full access to government, non-profit, or research organizations
with good records of data security if data is to be used "in research or in a public health
activity").
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